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This paper specifies and estimates a structural dynamic model of consumer demand for new 
and used durable goods. Its primary contribution is to provide an explicit estimation 
procedure for transaction costs, which are crucial to capturing the dynamic nature of 
consumer decisions. In particular, transaction costs play a key role in determining consumer 
replacement behavior in both primary and secondary markets for durable goods. The unique 
data set used in this paper has been collected by the Italian Motor Registry and covers the 
period from 1994 to 2004. It includes information about sales dates for individual cars over 
time as well as the initial stock of cars in the sample period. Identification of transaction 
costs is achieved from the variation in the share of consumers choosing to hold a given car 
type each period, and from the share of consumers choosing to purchase the same car type 
that period. Specifically, I estimate a random coefficients discrete choice model that 
incorporates a dynamic optimal stopping problem in the spirit of Rust (1987). I apply this 
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In many durable goods industries, such as that of automobiles, used products are often
traded in decentralized secondary markets. The U.S. Department of Transportation reports
that in 2004 13.6 million new vehicles and 42.5 million used vehicles were sold in the U.S.A.;
in the same year 2.5 million new vehicles and 4.7 million used vehicles were sold in Italy.
Transactions in the secondary market may occur because the quality of a durable deteriorates
over time and current owners sell their product in order to update to their preferred quality.
Alternatively the level of required maintenance and/or the probability of failure may increase
as the automobile ages, making replacement of the current unit desirable.
Durability and the presence of second-hand markets introduce dynamic considerations
into both producers￿output decisions and consumers￿purchase decisions in the automobile
market. Empirical models of demand for durable goods have focused mostly on the market
for new products (See Berry, Levinshon and Pakes (1995) ￿ henceforth BLP and Bresnahan
(1981)). Using sophisticated simulation techniques embodied in the logit framework, these
models are able to allow for general patterns of substitution across di⁄erentiated products.
However, they do not usually account for the intertemporal dependence of consumers￿deci-
sions that characterize markets for durable goods. They either ignore the secondary market
and its dynamics altogether or lump used goods into a composite outside option. In spite of
their importance and although the auto market is one of the most studied in the literature
(Bresnahan (1987), BLP (1995), Goldberg (1995), Petrin (2002)), there have been relatively
few empirical models of secondary markets for used goods.
An important feature of the automobile market is that the stock of cars held by consumers
is persistent over time. If a consumer owns a car in one year then it is likely that she will hold
the same car the following year as well. The persistence of consumer holdings of automobiles,
when durables depreciate over time, arises because of the presence of transaction costs such
as search costs, taxes, asymmetric information, switching costs, etc, which vary over time.
If there are no frictions a consumer would choose a quality that maximizes her utility in
each period and have no incentive to hold it across multiple periods once the quality of the
good depreciates. However, these frictions are present and they tend to make replacement
infrequent because consumers try to economize on the costs associated with these frictions.
Any model that tries to explain the pattern of consumer holdings in a market for semi-
durable goods must explicitly account for dynamic consumer considerations and the cost of
the replacement decision. The model that I present incorporates both of these features. More
speci￿cally, I assume consumers incur di⁄erent kinds of costs upon the replacement of their
automobile (i.e. taxes, search costs, dealer compensations etc.). I do not separately identify
the di⁄erent components of these costs but they are lumped together in a unique parameter
3to be estimated1. The quality of used goods is assumed to be common knowledge among
the agents, hence the model does not account explicitly for the presence of adverse selection.
Information about resales and prices along with ownership data of used cars provides a
potential source of identi￿cation for the transaction costs which has not been explored in
the previous literature.
I use a data set containing information about the Italian car market to examine how
unobserved heterogeneity and transaction costs a⁄ect replacement behavior. In particular, I
observe the pattern of sales and ownerships for each individual car type in the sample over
a period of 11 years. The possibility of following the history of each vehicle in the sample
is due to the presence, in the data, of a unique identi￿cation number assigned to each unit.
The data are from the Province of Isernia in Italy and are collected by the Motor Vehicle
Department. Identi￿cation of transaction costs is achieved from the di⁄erence between the
share of consumers choosing to hold a particular car type each period, and the share of
consumers choosing to purchase the same car type that period. The presence of these two
market shares for each car type represents the main strength of my unique data set. These
market shares are obtained in the model by aggregating consumers￿optimal decision that
take the depreciation of automobiles over time into account. With full information this
depreciation is captured by the decline in prices; then the pattern of sales and holdings,
along with the pattern of prices in the data is used to identify the transaction costs. The
structural model explicitly accounts for this information and provides an estimation of these
costs for each product at each point in time.
The contribution of this paper to the durable goods literature is twofold. First, it is the
￿rst paper which studies replacement behavior in the presence of secondary markets, using
aggregate data, while allowing for heterogeneity across consumers and endogeneity of price
in a dynamic setting. Second, it shows how the combination of ownership and purchase data
is useful to infer the size of transaction costs. Transaction costs play a central role in the
analysis of market structure and industry conduct for a variety of industries. The proposed
methodology can be used to measure transaction costs in the context of other industries as
well.
Finally, I investigate the e⁄ect of scrappage subsidies o⁄ered by the Italian government
to stimulate the early voluntary removal of used cars in 1997 and 1998. Such subsidies were
temporary and o⁄ered in exchange for used cars of delineated vintages to reduce environ-
mental pollution and stimulate car sales. Scrappage subsidies have been very popular in
the European Union as well as in the United States and Canada. The possibility that such
programs will be expanded has evoked a debate surrounding their e⁄ects on car markets
1While a unique parameter is estimated for each used car j in each time period t from the structural
model, the nature of these costs is subsequently analyzed.
4and consumers￿welfare. The model is used to investigate the impact of such policies on
consumers￿demand for new and used vehicles. The point of doing the analysis is to quan-
tify both the extent of the immediate incentive to replace and the subsequent e⁄ects of this
policy on sales as the distribution of car ages evolves. The model allows me to illustrate
and study the short and long run e⁄ects of the scrappage policies on new and used car sales
and government revenues accounting for richer dynamics where new and used car markets
interact.
I estimate a discrete choice logit model over a set of products with random coe¢ cients
on observable product characteristics that incorporates a dynamic optimal stopping problem
in the spirit of Rust (1987) using market-level data. The random coe¢ cients allow me to
relax the so-called independence of irrelevant alternative (IIA) property (see BLP (1995),
Browstone and Train (1999)) and allows the preferences to be correlated across vehicles.
Thus I construct a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator to deal with potential
price endogeneity. This is possible provided that one can recover the unobserved product
characteristics.
Berry (1994) suggests the use of a contraction mapping to ￿nd the mean product utilities.
I use a similar contraction mapping to invert both the market share of purchases, and the
market share of consumer holdings for each product in each period. The ￿rst market share
refers to the share of consumers who decide to acquire a car j conditional on buying/replacing
a vehicle. The market shares of consumer holdings refer to the share of consumers who keep
car j conditional on owning that car. Both market shares for each car type deliver information
about the mean level of utility and the mean level of transaction costs. As suggested by
the model, if transaction costs are paid by buyers, the market share of consumer holdings
conveys information on the mean product utility, whereas the market share of purchases
will, in addition, convey information on transaction costs. For each product, I solve for the
vectors of mean product characteristics and transaction costs that make the predicted shares
match the observable ones.
Because no individual level data is available, I need to compute the aggregate predicted
share of each product at any time period. Doing so requires integrating over the individ-
ual heterogeneity and consumer holdings once the consumer decides to replace her current
vehicle. Then, I allow consumers to solve a dynamic optimization problem based on expec-
tations about the stochastic process that governs the transition across di⁄erent states of the
durables and the market evolution. As in Rust (1987), the consumer￿ s decision problem is
formulated as an optimal stopping problem. Therefore, the consumer decides the optimal
time period in which to replace her current vehicle with a di⁄erent one. In my analysis, the
consumer￿ s decision to replace a car depends on her expectation about the future value of
the product she currently owns and on the perceived distribution about the future set of
5products available.
The emphasis on the presence of a second-hand market with transaction costs and good
depreciation distinguish the present model from BLP and Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2009)
￿ henceforth GR. GR (2009) extended Melnikov￿ s (2001) model to include consumer het-
erogeneity and examine the pattern of sales after the introduction of new digital cameras and
DVD players in a dynamic setting. As in those models, the major simplifying assumption
here is that consumers perceive the evolution of product characteristics to be a simple ￿rst
order Markov process, where the distribution of the next period￿ s product characteristics is
a polynomial function of a simple statistic: the logit inclusive value (Melnikov, 2001 and
Carranza, 2007). Gordon (2009) allows consumers to have the possibility of replacing the
good and he does not allow for price endogeneity and heterogeneity across consumers.
There are recent studies that deal with the implications of durability and secondary mar-
kets on the dynamics of car demand. Esteban and Shum (2006) estimate a model with
forward-looking consumers and ￿rms. They reduce consumer heterogeneity to a single di-
mension, and do not consider the presence of transaction costs. Having a single dimension
and considering a vertically di⁄erentiated market places strong restrictions on the substi-
tutability among cars in consumers￿choice sets.
Durables sold in second-hand markets are typically highly di⁄erentiated in quality and
this captures some of the motivations for consumer holdings. Stolyarov (2002) uses a dynamic
model with transaction costs to replicate the pattern of resales in the used car market.
His model restricts consumer heterogeneity to a single dimension, but does allow for the
possibility of infrequent replacement. He looks at a stationary environment in which all the
goods are homogenous in all aspects but the age. Transaction costs increase deterministically
over time. The model is calibrated to match the cross sectional pattern of resales. It does
not allow transaction costs to be di⁄erent across di⁄erent cars and time. Adda and Cooper
(2000) study the optimal decision rules from a dynamic discrete-choice model to explore the
e⁄ects of scrappage subsidies on new car demand in France. In their model, consumers are
homogenous so that in equilibrium, agents will choose either to keep the car or to replace
it with a new one by scrapping their old car. Hence, in their model, in equilibrium there is
no active secondary market. Consequently, a richer analysis of the scrappage design could
be carried out that accounts for the sale dynamics in the primary and secondary market
with di⁄erent implications in terms of the impact of this policy. Finally, Hendel and Lizzeri
(1999), Porter and Sattler (1999) and Schiraldi (2009) study vertical di⁄erentiated models
in which durable goods live for just two periods, so that used goods of all ages are lumped
together and derive some testable implications.
Complementary to these works, I contemporaneously allow for the presence of heteroge-
nous consumers under multiple dimensions, for the possibility of the price to be correlated
6with the unobservable characteristics and for the presence of frictions on the secondary mar-
ket given that durables depreciate over time. I use aggregate data to estimate the demand
parameters and the distribution of transaction costs across models and over time.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyses data. Section
3 discusses the model and the method of inference. Section 4 presents the results. Sec-
tion 5 investigates the e⁄ect of scrappage subsidies on the Italian automobile and section 6
concludes.
2 The automobile market
2.1 Data
The Italian automobile market is the fourth largest market in the world (after the US, Japan
and Germany) with about 2 million cars sold every year. Most cars sold are manufactured by
the FIAT Group that controls the following brands: FIAT, Lancia, Alfa Romeo, Innocenti,
Autobianchi, Ferrari and Maserati. The FIAT Group￿ s share was more then 50% in 1990
and has gradually decreased since then. Volkswagen, the second largest manufacturer had
a 14% market share; Ford between 7% and 11%; Citroen/Peugeot and Renault about 7%
each; Opel between 5% and 8% and BMW/Mercedes between 3% and 4%.
The data set covers the period from January 1994 to December 2004 for the Province
of Isernia in Italy. I have information on prices and characteristics of all new and most
popular used cars sold in Italy. This information comes from Quattroruote, the main monthly
automobile publication in Italy. Quantity data are provided by ACI, an association that runs
the registration records for the Department of Motor Vehicles in Italy. Information about
household income, population and price indexes for in￿ ation are available at the Bank of
Italy website and at the National Institute of Statistics website.2 I report some demographics
of the population in Table 1.
For all units in the sample, I observe the initial stock in 1994 and all subsequent individual
transactions (sales, scrappage decisions, etc.), for each transaction I observe whether or not a
car dealer was involved. I observe the manufacturer, the model, the engine displacement (cc),
the car size, the ￿rst registration year, the plate for each car and the data track sales dates
for individual cars over time. For the cars scrapped in 1997 and 1998, I have information
on whether the owner opted to buy a new car and availed of the government subsidy. If the
owner of a car moves to a location outside Isernia or sells it to a buyer living outside the
Province, then that particular unit is excluded from the sample in the subsequent periods.
It is similarly excluded if the owner decides to scrap the car. Analogously cars coming from
2www.bancaditalia.it, www.istat.it
7outside Isernia are included in the sample in the years following the purchase of these cars.
In 1994, the ￿rst period of the sample, I observe an initial stock of 37,980 vehicles. Over
the sample period I observe 82,254 transactions net of the transactions made by car dealers.
To achieve a manageable dimensionality, I group them into 2,178 categories based on the year,
on the vehicle￿ s age (0,..,10) where 0 stands for a new car and 10 groups together all the cars
10 years or older3, engine displacement (small if cc<=1300, medium if 1300<cc<=1800, large
if cc>1800) and type of fuel: gasoline or diesel and origin of manufacturers.4 In particular,
I consider three possible macro-groups of manufacturers:
￿ the Italian FIAT-Group that controls the following brands (all located in Italy): FIAT,
Lancia, Alfa Romeo, Innocenti, Autobianchi, Ferrari and Maserati
￿ manufacturers located in Germany: BMW, Mercedes, Opel, Volkswagen, Audi and
Porsche
￿ a residual group that is mostly accounted for by Ford, Peugeot, Renault and Seat (the
Korean and Japanese manufacturers have a very tiny market share due to the presence
of quotas)
Up until 2000 Quattroruote provided price information only for cars that were up to 8,
or in some cases 9, years old. I ￿ll in the missing prices by assuming for each car model a
subsequent depreciation rate (i.e. beyond the 8th or 9th year) equal to the depreciation rate
the car experienced in the previous period.
In the empirical analysis, I focus on the market for passenger cars, excluding trucks, vans,
minivans, SUVs and luxury cars (like Ferrari and Lamborghini), in part because I do not
have price information for them. The total proportion of these cars is less than 2% of the
initial stock and about 2% of all the transactions over the 11 years. Furthermore, I assume
that the owners of a 10-year old car receive the market price of that car type irrespective of
whether they decide to sell or scrap the car.
Table 3 reports some descriptive statistics about prices and quantities of new and used
cars in the data. Figure 1 shows the pattern of sales of new and used cars in the data. The to-
tal amount of new units purchased suddenly jumped in 1997 when the government introduced
the scrappage policy. The scrappage policy, which involved subsidizing car replacement, was
aimed at increasing road safety, reducing environmental pollution and stimulating car sales.
3I assume that a 10-year old car no longer depreciates and provides the same utility to the consumer.
Therefore, I also assume that the price is the same across cars older than 10 years except for the stochastic
component ￿jt:
4The choice of engine displacement as a key characteristic to identify the di⁄erent products seems natural
in this context for two reasons. First, the scrappage-policies was designed according to this characteristic (as
explained later) and second, until 1999 property taxes were paid based on the size of the engine displacement.
8From January 1997 until September 1997 the government awarded a bonus, the amount of
which depended on the size (engine displacement) of the new replacement bought. The cash
subsidy accruing to consumers was conditional on buying a new car and the burden was
jointly borne by the government and the car manufacturer. The program was scheduled to
expire in September 1997 but was extended until the end of the year. In 1998, a similar
scheme, lasting from February to September, was introduced. Observe that the purchases
of used cars slowed down in 1997 and 1998 and there was a steep increase in the following
years. The increase in the number of used cars traded indicates a more active second-hand
market over time. The increase in the volume of used cars transactions is explained by the
reduction of taxes to pay upon registration over the considered time horizon.
2.2 A closer look at transaction costs
The distinguishing feature of durable goods, and in particular of automobiles, is its potential
for resale. In the absence of some sort of market frictions or information asymmetries,
consumers have no incentive to hold their durables across multiple quality levels. Each
heterogeneous consumer will choose a durable from the product spectrum so as to maximize
her net surplus. Hence, if there are no frictions in the market it should observe a high
turnover rate. Speci￿cally, if the good depreciates every period (as in my model) consumers
will never hold their durable more than one period but they will always update to their
preferred car quality (see for example Hendel and Lizzeri 1999a, Hideo and Sandfort 2002,
Rust 1985 among others). While in my model consumers incur di⁄erent kinds of costs upon
the replacement of their automobile (i.e. taxes, search costs, dealer compensations etc.), the
quality of used goods is assumed to be common knowledge among the agents. Therefore
no adverse selection is present in the used car market. The transaction costs associated
play a crucial role in explaining the consumers￿decisions to replace their car. Each period,
consumers assess the quality of the durable they own. If the gain in utility from updating
their holdings, net of prices, exceeds transaction costs, consumers sell their used goods in
the secondhand market and replace them with durables of the preferred quality. It follows
that the high level of transaction costs reduces the frequency of replacement. The two
driving assumption are: (1) cars depreciate after every year; (2) consumer preferences (for
car characteristics) are perfectly persistent.
A ￿rst look at the data, and in particular at the average resale ratio (i.e., the percentage
of the stock of a given type, or brand, of a given age of car resold in a period; durable good
trading volume) across all cars in each year gives an idea about the presence and size of
transaction costs. We can observe, by looking at Figure 2, that the average resale ratio per
9year varies between 0.15 and 0.25.5 This is substantially lower than 100% trade as would
be predicted by vertical di⁄erentiation models with consumers￿heterogeneity but without
frictions, and suggest the presence of a relevant level of transaction costs (for a comparison
between markets with and without frictions see Anderson and Ginsburgh 1994, Hendel and
Lizzeri 1999b, Stolyarov 2002 among others). Figure 3 reports the same ratios at a more
disaggregate level: I report the resale ratios for Fiat and Volkswagen compact cars. Figure
3 suggests the presence of di⁄erent levels of transaction costs for di⁄erent models/types.
A strength of my model and my estimation procedure is that it can recover the whole
distribution of transaction costs for di⁄erent car types in each point in time.
Consumers with a preference for quality wish to replace durables that deteriorate. When
quality deterioration is small, some buyers of the new durable retain ownership of their unit
rather than incur the costs associated with transaction of the used durable goods. When
quality deterioration of a durable good is large relative to the transaction costs of the used
durable good market, however, more owners of the durable will wish to sell their units and
purchase a new unit in the current period. Thus the durable good￿ s volume of trade is
also directly related to the quality depreciation. With full information, prices re￿ ect this
deterioration.6 Exploiting this insight, I regress the resale ratios for di⁄erent models/ages
of cars on the price depreciation and car characteristics (the age of the car, the engine size
(cc)). To control for unobservable quality, I also add model dummies and time dummies.
Results are reported in Table 4. Notice that the volume of trade is positive correlated with
price depreciation as we should expect in a model with transaction costs.7 The presence of
transaction costs in the market could cause a potential endogeneity problem in the previous
regression, the transaction costs which are omitted could potentially be correlated with the
price depreciation. Starting from 2001, Quattroruote publishes a rating (that runs from 1
to 5) which re￿ ects how easy is to trade each given car on the secondary market. To further
analyze the presence of transaction costs, I collected this data from 2002 to 2004 and then
ran the same regression as above, also including this additional variable. More speci￿cally, I
included these ratings (with negative sign) which should capture the presence of transaction
costs related to speci￿c car models. I report the results in Table 5. As expected, the volume
of trade is negative correlated with such a variable, whereas the sign of price depreciation
does not change.
5The unit of observation is model/age for di⁄erent car segments: Sub-compact cars, Compact cars,
Medium size cars, Med/Full-size cars, Full-size cars.
6See Hendel and Lizzeri 1999a and Gilligan 2004 for further discussion about the e⁄ect of asymmetric
information.
7The model does not explicitly address the potential adverse selection problem. As noted in Gilligan
(2004), the presence of transaction costs and consequently a positive correlation between volume of trade
and price depreciation does not necessarly exclude also the presence of asymmetric information in the market.
10Having presented evidence for the presence of transaction costs, the next sections are
devoted to structural estimate a model for consumers￿replacement to measure the size of
transaction costs and derive better demand estimates and consequently more suitable price
elasticity. Finally I use the model to investigate the scrapping policy.
3 Model and Inference
Consider an in￿nite horizon model and ￿nite types of durable goods (BMW, Mercedes, FIAT,
and so on). The good is durable, but it depreciates over time. A physical stochastic process
describes the transformation of the condition of the vehicle in period t to its condition in
period t + 1.
Each consumer is assumed to consume, at most, one unit of the good. Since products
degrade over time, a given consumer will desire to replace her durable over time, either
with a brand new durable or with a secondhand one. In the model, consumers have perfect
information about durables so that there is no lemon problem. In addition there is a perfectly
divisible good (money), which is treated as numeraire. Consumers maximize the expected
lifetime utility using a discount factor ￿ 2 (0;1).
Let jt denote the set of new cars available in period t and Jt = fj : j 2 f[t
￿=1j￿gg this
denotes the set of all possible products attainable in period t in the primary or secondary
market. In every period there is always the possibility to opt for the outside option, i.e.
j = 0, which corresponds to not owning a car.
At the beginning of each period, each consumer i may or may not have a car endowment
from previous purchases. If she does not have any vehicle, she simply decides whether or
not to purchase one. If she has a car endowment; immediately upon entering period t the
durable depreciates according to the exogenous depreciation process. Then the consumer
decides whether to hold, sell or scrap that car. If she gets rid of the car (via scrap or sale),
she also decides whether or not to purchase a di⁄erent car among the Jt [ f0g products
present in the primary and secondary market in period t (including the outside option). In
either case, she faces a similar (though not identical) decision problem in time t + 1: Since
consumers can delay purchase, they face a dynamic optimization problem of when, if ever,
to purchase any given (new or used) car available. The consumer￿ s choice maximizes her
expected discounted utility conditional on her information and endowment in each given
period.
Each product j 2 Jt is characterized by observed physical characteristics xjt (for example
engine displacement, fuel, age, size, etc.); the unobserved (by the econometrician) product
characteristic ￿jt, the price pjt and the unobserved (by the econometrician) transaction cost
￿jt: I assume that the transaction cost is paid by the consumer (along with the price) every
11time that she purchases a car and it captures the presence of searching costs, ￿nancial costs,
switching costs, asymmetric information and so on. I also assume that no transaction costs
are paid if the consumer opts for the outside option and p0t = 0.
Consumers are heterogenous in the evaluation of how intensively they prefer car charac-
teristics and in their price sensitivity. Consumers also have an idiosyncratic shock to their
preferences for each good and in each period. Let ￿it = (￿i0t;￿i1t;:::;￿iJtt) be the vector of
idiosyncratic shocks of consumer i for period t and capture horizontal di⁄erentiation, which
are i:i:d. across (i;j;t).
A consumer i derives the following one-period utilities for each of the possible choices at
time t: If the consumer i keeps the car she already owns (the car k 2 Jt￿1) she gets utility
~ u
k
it = xkt ￿
x
i + ￿kt + ￿ikt (1)
If the consumer sells her car and purchases a di⁄erent car j 2 Jt, she gets utility
u
kj
it = xjt ￿
x
i + ￿jt ￿ ￿
p
ipjt ￿ ￿jt + ￿
p
ipkt + ￿ijt (2)
If she replaces the car she pays the price and the transaction costs for the new car, pjt
and ￿jt; and cashes the value of her endowment, pkt: If, instead, the consumer sells the car





ipkt + ￿i0t (3)
A consumer who does not hold any product in period t obtains a mean ￿ ow utility which I
set equal to zero and in particular ~ u0
it = ￿i0t. Assume that the error term, ￿ijt; is independent
across consumers, products and time and is Type I extreme value distributed. Finally ￿
p
i
represent consumer i￿ s price sensitivity for cars and ￿x
i is an individual-speci￿c preference
for car characteristics.
The same product in subsequent years di⁄ers by the age and by its unobservable characteristics;
hence both these elements capture the depreciation of durables over time. The depreciation
is not deterministic because the unobserved product characteristic evolves stochastically over
time.
Formally, consumer i who initially owns a durable k seeks an in￿nite sequence of decision-











where ￿t = fd;jg where d, denotes a consumer￿ s replacement decision at time t, d = 0
(keep), d = 1 (replace) and j 2 Jt [ f0g is the optimal replacement at time t if d = 1: ￿it
12includes current product attributes and prices, product availability, the year, and any other
market characteristics which may a⁄ect the ￿rms product pricing, entry, exit, or change in
attributes.8 In general, it includes all variables at time t in consumer i￿ s information set that
a⁄ect her utility or value for waiting. I assume that ￿it+1 evolves according to some Markov




it if d = 0
u
kj
it if d = 1 and j 2 Jt [ f0g
In each period, a consumer chooses her optimal action given her initial endowment k;
preferences, current product qualities, prices, product availability, and expectations over
future values of these characteristics and in particular over the stochastic value of her en-
dowment. To solve the consumer￿ s problem, I must solve for the value function ^ Vi which is
the unique solution to Bellman￿ s equation. A consumer￿ s value function from being on the
market for a car, conditional on following her optimal policy and her initial endowment k,
is given by:
^ Vi(k;￿it;￿it) = maxf~ u
k
it + ￿E[^ Vi(￿it+1;￿it+1;k)j￿it;￿it)]
| {z }






it + ￿E[^ Vi(￿it+1;￿it+1;j)j￿it;￿it)]
| {z }




it + ￿E[^ Vi(￿it+1;￿it+1;0)j￿it;￿it)]
| {z }
Sell the car and consume the outside option
g
If k = 0 the consumer value function is




it + ￿E[^ Vi(￿it+1;￿it+1;j)j￿it;￿it)]
| {z }




it + ￿E[^ Vi(￿it+1;￿it+1;0)j￿it;￿it)]
| {z }
Still consume the outside option
g
The state space of the problem is too large for the consumer￿ s full dynamic automobile
replacement decision problem to be computationally solvable. Hence in the next subsection,
I make some assumptions in order to reduce the dimensionality of the state space.
3.1 Simpli￿cations and assumptions
The goal of the present subsection is to introduce and discuss di⁄erent assumptions to
simplify the optimal dynamic problem, to reduce the dimension of the state space and to
make it computationally tractable.
8In paricular, I assume ￿it includes also the attribute of the good of the good hold by the consumer.
13The ￿rst step towards simplifying the problem is to write the value function in a more
convenient way. It is opportune to subtract the price of the car owned from equation (4),
then substituting for (1), (2) and (3) we can rewrite it as follows:









i + ￿jt ￿ ￿
p
ipjt ￿ ￿jt + ￿ijt + ￿E[^ Vi(￿it+1;￿it+1;j)j￿it;￿it];
xkt ￿
x
i + ￿kt ￿ ￿
p
ipkt + ￿ikt + ￿E[^ Vi(￿it+1;￿it+1;k)j￿it;￿it]
o
If I rede￿ne Vi(k;￿it;￿t) ￿ ^ Vi(k;￿it;￿t) ￿ ￿
p
ipkt and substitute it back into the previous
equation I have9:
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p
ipkt + ￿ikt + ￿E[￿
p
ipkt+1 + Vi(￿it+1;￿it+1;k)j￿it;￿it]g
where the expected price in t+1 enters linearly because prices enter additively in the cur-
rent utility function (see equations 1, 2 and 3). Notice that p0t = 0 implies Vi(0;￿it+1;￿it+1) =
^ Vi(0;￿it+1;￿it+1):
Hence equation (5) is equal to:





i + ￿jt ￿ ￿
p
ipjt ￿ ￿jt + ￿ijt + ￿E[￿
p
ipjt+1 + Vi(￿it+1;￿it+1;j)j￿it;￿it]g
Notice that ￿it already includes the vector of prices, hence there is no need to explicitly
include the resale price as a state variable, once the change of variable is performed. This
transformation is not strictly necessary in order to estimate the model but it is convenient
to reduce the computational costs of the estimation. I defer further discussion after the
de￿nition of the logit inclusive value.
In order to evaluate consumer i￿ s choice at time t, I need to formalize consumer i￿ s
expectations about the utility from future products and from the product that she may
potentially own. I assume that consumers have no information about the future values of
the idiosyncratic unobservable shocks ￿ijt beyond their distribution. The set of products,
their prices, their characteristics and transaction costs vary across time due to entry and
exit, technological progress and changes in prices for existing products, according to optimal
price decisions. Consumers are uncertain about the future product attributes, but rationally
9Notice ￿it already includes also the vector of prices, hence I do not need to explicitly include pkt as a
state variable.
14expect them to evolve, based on the current market structure. Consequently, the dynamic
consumers￿optimization problem potentially depends on the whole set of information, ￿it;
available in period t and the particular endowment k of each consumer i at time t:
The main issue in the estimation procedure is the ￿curse of dimensionality￿ usually
associated with these kinds of problems. To simplify the problem I make some assumptions
in line with the existing literature. As in Rust (1987), let EVi(j;￿it) =
R
￿it Vi(j;￿it;￿it)dP￿
8j 2 Jt￿1[f0g denote the expectation of the value function, integrated over the realization of
￿it; which follows from Rust￿ s conditional independence assumption. The next step to reduce
the dimensionality of the state space is to identify a few variables that can summarize the
information available in each moment and describe how consumers form their expectation
based on these elements. This simpli￿cation will be done by introducing a state variable
(the net augmented utility ￿ ow) which captures the depreciation of the good over time,
along with the more common logit inclusive value10, a scalar-valued su¢ cient statistic used
in the literature to characterize the distribution of future payo⁄s. This de￿nes the net
augmented utility ￿ ow as:
￿ijt ￿ xjt ￿
x
i + ￿jt ￿ ￿
p
i(pjt ￿ ￿Et [pjt+1]) (9)
where (pjt ￿ ￿Et [pjt+1]) is the rental price of car j in period t. The rental price accounts
for the cost of keeping a particular good j for a single period of time. The net augmented
utility ￿ ow, ￿ijt; captures the mean ￿ ow utility derived by the consumer i from keeping the
durable net of the rental price; it includes both elements of consumer characteristics and
elements of product characteristics.11 I also de￿ne the mean net augmented utility ￿ ow as
^ ￿jt = xjt ￿x+￿jt which is a product speci￿c term common to all consumers and will be used
in the subsection (3.2.1).12
In a durable-goods setting, where the quality of the goods changes over time and there
is the possibility of reselling, consumers maximize the utility derived from the good in any
particular period net of the implicit rental price paid in that period to keep the good. Hence
the net augmented utility ￿ ow seems a natural index, that captures the per period quality
adjusted by the price that consumers account to make their decisions.
Finally, I use the aggregation proprieties of the type 1 extreme value distribution of ￿ijt
to express the expectation of the Bellman equation in a relatively simple form. In particular,
the expected value of the best choice from several options in a logit model, can be expressed
10The logit inclusive value was ￿rst introduced by Melnikov (2001) and subsequently used in the literature
of dynamic demand models.
11Note that for the outside option ￿i0t = 0:
12 ^ ￿jt is a product speci￿c term common to all consumers whereas ￿ijt includes both the product speci￿c
terms and consumers speci￿c terms. In particular given ^ ￿jt, the simulated draws vi and the vector of
nonlinear parameters f￿p;￿g, ￿ijt is easily derived: ￿ijt = ^ ￿jt +
P
j xjt ￿vi ￿ ￿
p
i(pjt ￿ ￿Et [pjt+1]):












The logit inclusive value is the maximum expected utility from buying one of the Jt
products present in the primary and secondary market in period t: Notice the importance
of the transformation made at the beginning of this subsection, this allows me to uniquely
de￿ne the net augmented utility ￿ ow independently from the fact that the car is purchased
or owned by consumers. Moreover, without the above transformation, the logit inclusive
function would also have been function of the price of the car owned. Consequently prices
should have been accounted explicitly among the state variables, with a substantial increment
of the computational time needed to estimate the model.13
To reduce the dimensionality of the state space and describe how consumers form their
expectation, I assume that each consumer perceives the evolution of the net augmented
utility ￿ ow and the logit inclusive value to evolve, according to a ￿rst-order process that
depends on the previous value of the variables themselves:










where Gi is consumer speci￿c.
Similarly to the Inclusive Value Su¢ ciency assumption introduced by GR, the previous
assumption implies that all states characterized by the same pair f￿ikt;￿itg have the same
expected value. This assumption can be interpreted as an assumption that consumers are
boundedly rational and use only a subset of the data potentially available to them, in form-
ing their expectations. Although reducing the state space dramatically, this assumption may
not be consistent with an underlying supply model. Many di⁄erent quality or market char-
acteristics could potentially lead to the same value of f￿ikt;￿itg; which may have di⁄erent
implications in the evolution of the industry, and nevertheless will imply the same expecta-
tion about their evolutions in the present model. For the estimation of the model, I assume
that the Markov processes take the following linear functional form:
￿it+1 = ￿1i + ￿2i￿it + ￿it (11)











where ￿ijt ￿ xjt ￿x
i +￿jt￿￿
p
ipjt is for the cars available to purchase on the market and ￿
k
ikt ￿ xjt ￿x
i +￿jt
is for the car owned.
16￿ijt+1 = ￿1i + ￿2i￿ijt + ￿it (12)
where ￿it and ￿it are jointly normally distributed and ￿1i; ￿2i;￿1i and ￿2i are incidental
parameters speci￿c to each consumer i. Focusing on the evolution of the logit inclusive
value, similar functional forms as (11) have been used in the existing dynamic literature
(see Melnikov, 2001; Hendel & Nevo, 2006). However, the implication of the assumption is
more closely related to GR (2009) because the speci￿cation of ￿it includes not only prices
and characteristics of the products available, but also future optimal decision-making.14 In
Melnikov, the simpli￿cation results from the assumption that there is no repeat purchase,
implying that the choice of a product is the ￿nal choice made by the consumer. Hendel &
Nevo achieve this result by specifying ￿it only over (exogenous) characteristics that a⁄ect the
consumer in the current period and do not a⁄ect dynamic decision making. In the present
model, I allow all quality characteristics of a purchased product to a⁄ect future upgrading
decisions. The drawback of this de￿nition is that it makes assumptions on the evolution of
￿it potentially more restrictive: the assumption re￿ ects consumer decision-making (￿ ow but
continuation values), which is endogenous to the model.15 However in the present framework,
consumers￿expectations are also based on the evolution of the net augmented utility ￿ ow
which, in the spirit of the previous papers, includes only the price and characteristics of the
product owned by consumers and loosens the more restrictive implications of (11) alone used
in GR (2009).
Using the previous assumptions, I can write EVi(￿it) as EVi(￿ikt;￿it) and rewrite the
Bellman equations (7) and (8) for consumer i as:
EVi(￿ikt;￿it) = ln(exp(￿it) + exp(￿ikt + ￿E[EVi(￿ikt+1;￿it+1j￿ikt;￿it)) (13)
+exp(￿E[EVi(0;￿it+1j￿ikt;￿it)))
EVi(0;￿it) = ln(exp(￿it) + exp(￿E[EVi(0;￿it+1j￿it))) (14)
The aggregate demand for a product is determined by the solution to the consumer￿ s op-
timization problem. Speci￿cally the probability that a consumer of type i with good k

























it denote the probability that a consumer of type i with good k 2 Jt￿1 [ f0g chooses
not to make a purchase and retain her existing product:
14Similar assumption has also been used by Shcherbakov (2008) to study switching costs between cable
and satellite television.
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where sikt is the fraction of consumers of type i that own product k at the end of period t:
In particular:







ijt are obtained as in equations (17) and (18) without integrating over the
consumer heterogeneity. The market size Mt is observed and evolves deterministically over
time.
3.2 Estimation
I set the discount factor ￿ = 0:9 and the total market size M equal to the adult population in
the area. I have also used the observed prices as proxy for the expected prices in computing
the rental value when I perform the estimation. As in Berry, Levinson and Pakes (1999), I
assume that the price sensitivity varies with income. Accordingly, I assume that ￿
p
i has a
time-varying distribution that is a lognormal approximation to the distribution of income in




yi ; where ￿p is a parameter to be estimated. In this way, price sensitivity is modeled as
inversely proportional to income. This allows me to use the exogenously available information
on the income distribution to increase the e¢ ciency of our estimation procedure. Moreover,
I assume that consumers di⁄er in the preference for the age of the car. More speci￿cally, I
assume that consumer preference for the age of the car ￿
age
i are independently distributed
normally with mean ￿age and standard deviation ￿￿age ; i.e. ￿
age
i = ￿age + ￿i￿￿age where
￿i ￿ N(0;1):
18Following Berry￿ s (1994) strategy, I recover the set of unobservable product character-
istics and transaction costs (￿jt; ￿jt) for any parameter vector ￿ that perfectly rationalize
the model￿ s predicted market shares16, and then employ a generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimator, via forming conditional moments. I leverage the dynamic nature of my
data and assume that the unobservable characteristics for each automobile evolve according
to an exogenous Markov process, and these innovations in product unobservables, ￿jt; (and
not the product unobservables themselves) are uncorrelated with a vector of instruments.17
More speci￿cally, I assume:
Assumption 2. Unobservable product characteristics for each automobile evolve accord-
ing to a ￿rst-order autoregressive process, where the error terms
&jt = ￿jt ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿jt￿1
are independent of each other and
E [Zjt&jt] = 0
where Zjt are instruments.
The drift of this process is set to 0 since it is not separately identi￿ed from the constant in
the mean utility and ￿ is a parameter to be estimated. The instruments used are described
in subsection 3.2.2. Moreover, I add a set of moments, chosen to improve the identi￿cation
of consumers￿price sensitivity: the fraction of people who used the scrappage scheme to
replace their old automobile with a brand new one in 1997 and 1998.
Let ￿1 = f￿p; ￿;￿￿age g be the nonlinear and ￿2 = f￿xg be the linear parameters; then
￿ = f￿1;￿2g are all the parameters to estimate: The GMM estimator is given by:





where G(￿) is a vector of stacked moments and W is the weighting matrix:18 The computa-
16Having two market shares to match for the same product, I can pin down two vectors of error term:
￿jt which allows me to match the market share of purchasing and ￿jt which allows me to match the market
share of holding. See the discussion in the subsection 3.2.1.
17This assumption is also discussed in BLP (1994) and used by Sweeting (2007) and Lee (2009). An
alternative approach would have been to assume that the demand shock ￿jt is orthogonal to the observable
product characteristics and the standard excluded instruments suggested by BLP and based on rival charac-
teristics. However, there are no ￿rms producing second-hand goods. Hence the intuition behind instruments
that are excluded from demand but included in supply to identify the demand curve cannot be found in
used-goods markets. I thank the referee for this discussion.
18The diagonal elements of the weighting matrix should be the inverse of the variance of the moment. For
variance of micromoments, I use (p)(1 ￿ p)=No, where p is the value of the moment in the data, and No
is the number of consumers elegible for the subsidy. As this variance is very small, our weighting matrix
puts a high weight on the micromoments so our estimation algorithm attempts to match these very closely.
See BLP (2004) and Petrin (2002) for more details on calculating weighting matrices when combining micro
moments with aggregate moments.
19tion of the objective function requires knowledge of the weight matrix, W; which in general
requires knowledge of either the true value of the parameters or consistent estimates of these.
There are several solutions to this problem. I follow Nevo￿ s (2000) two-step approach: I ￿rst
assume homoscedastic errors and therefore the optimal weight matrix is proportional to Z0Z:
I can then compute an estimate of the vector ￿ and use this estimate to compute a new weight
matrix to perform the second and ￿nal estimation of the parameters. As discussed in Nevo
(2000), ￿2 can be expressed as function of ￿1 ; therefore the nonlinear search is performed
only over ￿1 using a non-derivative based Nelder and Mead (1965) simplex algorithm.
3.2.1 Computation
This section outlines the algorithm used to jointly estimate the parameters of the model and
the distribution of transaction costs. Using an approach similar to GR (2009), I combine
BLP￿ s (1995) procedure to recover the unobserved product characteristics ￿jt and transaction
costs ￿jt with Rust￿ s (1987) ￿xed point algorithm to solve consumers￿dynamic optimization
problems. Once ￿jt is recovered, the objective function in (20) can be computed. Hence, the
nonlinear search is performed to recover the parameters of the model. Figure 4 shows an
overview of the computation algorithm described in detail below.
For a given vector of ￿1 and a set of random draws; the mean net augmented utilities ^ ￿jt
and the transaction costs ￿jt which rationalize predicted market shares to observed market
shares of consumers￿holdings and of consumers￿purchases, are found via the contraction
mappings similar to those in BLP. For each iteration of the mappings, consumer beliefs over
the evolution of the logit inclusive value ￿it+1 and the net augmented utility ￿ ow ￿ijt are
updated. More speci￿cally for each iteration of the BLP mappings (hence for each value of
^ ￿jt, ￿jt) and given the nonlinear parameters ￿1; the set of simulated draws is used to calculate
the logit inclusive values as in equation (10), and net augmented utility19 as in equation (9).
Both these variables are used to estimate the coe¢ cients of the Markov process regressions
in (11) and (12). These coe¢ cients are then used to construct the transition matrix and to
calculate the expected value function from (13) and (14) by iteration (Rust, 1987). Hence
individual probabilities are computed as in (15) and (16). The number and identity of con-
sumers for each product available on the market evolves according to individual probability
of buying or keeping product j predicted by the model. The individual probabilities are
aggregated as in (17), (18) and (19) to form predicted market-level purchase and holding
probabilities. Finally, the aggregate shares are used to update ^ ￿jt and ￿jt. The procedure
iterates until ^ ￿jt and ￿jt converge at which ￿jt is recovered from the ￿nal value of ^ ￿jt via
linear regression.20 Then the objective function in (20) is computed and the nonlinear search
19Speci￿cally ￿ijt = ^ ￿jt +
P
j xjt ￿vi ￿ ￿
p
i(pjt ￿ ￿Et [pjt+1]):
20A potential alternative approach to utilizing multiple nested-￿xed point routines includes Mathematical
20of ￿1 is performed using the Nelder and Mead simplex algorithm to recover the parameters
of the model.
The main innovation with respect to the algorithm in GR is the use of two BLP-type
contraction mappings to recover ^ ￿jt and ￿jt.21 Berry (1994) suggests inverting the product
market shares to recover the implied mean utilities for each good. Hence, given K di⁄erent
market shares it is possible to recover K di⁄erent mean utilities. In my setting, I observe
2K market shares for K used products: I observe for each used car the market share of
consumers￿purchase and market share of consumers￿holding. Hence I invert these shares
and I can recover the mean (net augmented) utilities and the transaction costs for each good.
The mean net augmented utilities ^ ￿jt which rationalize predicted market shares to observed
market shares of consumers￿holdings, are found via iteration of the following equation,
^ ￿
0

















The car mean utilities net of the transaction costs (￿jt￿￿jt) rationalize the predicted market
shares to the observed market share of consumers￿purchases,
(^ ￿jt ￿ ￿jt)




























are computed from equations (17) and (18) and  1
and  2 are tuning parameters while ￿ sH
jt and ￿ sD
jt are the corresponding shares observed in the
data. I have found that the speed of convergence of equation (21) is higher than (22); and
to avoid instability in the convergence process I set  2 = (1 ￿ ￿)2 and  1 = 1 ￿ ￿:
As in GR, there is no proof of the existence of a unique ￿xed point. However, no problems
with convergence or multiple solutions were encountered.
More computational details. To perform the iterative calculation, I discretize the
state space (￿ikt;￿it) and compute the transition matrix following Tauchen (1986). Specif-
ically, I compute the value function by discretizing ￿ikt into 20 evenly-spaced grid points
and ￿it into 20 evenly-spaced grid points and allowing 400 points for the transition matrix.
I specify that ￿it and ￿ikt can take on values from 15% below the observed values to 15%
above. I have examined the impact of easing each of these restrictions and found that they
have very small e⁄ects on the results.
Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC), which has been shown to yield computational advantages
in related problems (Su and Judd, 2008; Dube, Fox, and Su, 2008)
21The other innovation is due to the presence of two state variables which characterize consumers￿dynamic
optimization problems. Consequently the transition matrix is computed based on the estimated coe¢ cients
of two Markov process regressions, (11) and (12).
21I assume that ￿it and ￿it are uncorrelated22 to reduce the computational burden of the
model in constructing the transition matrix.
Since the estimation algorithm is computationally intensive and computational time is
roughly proportional to the number of simulation draws, I use importance sampling to reduce
sampling variance, as in BLP and GR. Finally, instead of drawing i.i.d. pseudo-random
normal, I use Halton sequences to further reduce the sampling variance. In practice, I use
80 draws. Results for the base speci￿cation do not change substantively when I use more
draws.
3.2.2 Identi￿cation
Here I present a heuristic discussion of the intuition for identi￿cation. As discussed in the
introduction, the persistence in demand is driven by the presence of transaction costs. The
key assumptions are: cars depreciate after every year and consumer preferences are perfectly
persistent, therefore a consumer who faces no frictions will always prefer after one period to
resale the car to upgrade to his preferred quality.
The parameters in the utility function, a and ￿; are identi￿ed analogous to BLP. Among
people that choose to buy any car, I look at the share that choose each product. As the set
of available cars on the market and their prices change, market shares change. The extent
to which consumers are attracted to any particular characteristic in the x vector identi￿es
￿. The extent to which they substitute from products with similar x variables identi￿es
￿. For example, if the price falls for a particular car and it attracts the market share from
similar cars, we will ￿nd that ￿ is large. That is, I match this feature by saying that there
is substantial consumer heterogeneity in preferences. If the product attracts market share
from a di⁄use set of products, that is similar to the standard logit model, and I ￿nd that ￿
is small. Note that as in GR but di⁄erent from BLP, my model makes use of substitution
across time periods. For instance, a price decline in this period leads to low sales for similar
products in the next period, that also leads us to ￿nd that ￿ is large.
The challenge that is unique to my model is to separately identify the product unob-
servable characteristic, ￿jt, from the unobservable transaction costs, ￿jt. To separate these
two unobservable components, I use the information from the two shares: the share of con-
sumers choosing to hold a given car type each period, and the share of consumers choosing
to purchase the same car type in the same period.
As the car depreciates there will be consumers who would like to re-optimize and choose
22I have examined this assumption using the Monte Carlo technique. The correlation between these two
error terms converges rapidly to zero as J increases. In particular, they are uncorrelated for J > 150 which
is the minimum number of products available in the market and used for the estimation. The Monte Carlo
results are provided upon request.
22a di⁄erent alternative that better matches their taste. However, the replacement decision
depends on the size of the transaction costs; the maximum utility that a consumer can
obtain by replacing the car is reduced by the size of the transaction cost he will pay. With
full information, prices re￿ ect the deterioration in quality. Conditional on replacing the car,
￿jt ￿ ￿jt is identi￿ed from demand among consumers that choose to buy good j: In my
model, purchase behavior identi￿es the mean utilities of products, net of transaction costs.
To identify ￿jt, I use a separate vector of market shares: the share of consumers who choose
not to sell their car but to keep it at the beginning of each period. The intuition is that
comparing the mean utilities of what is available on the market, to those of the products
that consumers hold, would predict a much larger set of sales than we see in the data.
This discrepancy is explained by the transaction costs.23 More generally, a model without
transaction costs implies consumers never want to hold goods for more than one period, so
the relative distribution of sales and holdings identi￿es the distribution of transaction costs.
This argument is heuristic. Since all of the elements of the model are solved for simulta-
neously, all of the variation in the data contributes to the identi￿cation of each parameter.
For instance, transaction costs are, in part, determined by purchase decisions: when con-
sumers make a purchase, they rationally predict the transaction costs they will realize when
they eventually sell it.
Discussion on assumptions and simpli￿cations. The tractability of the estimation
is achieved on the assumption that the logit error term is i.i.d. across time, individuals
and products. One would expect there to be some factors that are not observed by the
researcher that a⁄ect each of the decision makers￿choices. Random coe¢ cients generate
persistent unobserved heterogeneity over time, alleviating this problem. Moreover, the ran-
dom coe¢ cients reduce the undesirable features of the IIA of the logit model. The logit
errors provide a possible source of the lack of resale. It is technically possible for a consumer
to realize a sequence of logit errors such that she does not want to sell her car. However,
this will not be su¢ cient to explain consumers holding behavior. If I do not account for the
presence of transaction costs, the comparison among mean utilities of what is available on
the market to those of the products that consumers hold would predict a much larger set of
sales than what is observed in the data.
An issue to deal with is the initial distribution of consumer types across di⁄erent car
types. To account for the initial distribution, I estimate a static random coe¢ cient model
without transaction costs. Then, I use the resulting distribution of consumer types as the
initial distribution of consumers across di⁄erent car types for the full model estimation. I
23From the perspective of BLP, one might view ￿j as coming from a set of dummies in the outside option
for the car that the consumer holds.
23have tried di⁄erent options24, the results are quite similar.
Finally, over the 11 years which I consider, there has been the introduction of the scrap-
page policy in 1997 and 1998 which potentially requires the introduction of a third state
variable in the model. I do not introduce it for two reasons: ￿rst the policy was introduced
in 1997 for a few months and then renewed again in 1998 for a few months with stringent
requirements in the way to bene￿t of the policy. The subsidies were awarded to consumers
who had owned a car for at least one year. First, this requirement restricts the possibility
that consumers could have modi￿ed their replacement behavior, in advance, to take advan-
tage of a law that was not issued yet. Second, data availability and computational costs.
An introduction of a third state variable would have required a richer speci￿cation than (4)
with more parameters to estimate using only 11 points given the 11 years observed.
Instruments. Valid instruments must be correlated with the regressors but uncorrelated
with the time t unobservable innovation. Although observed product characteristics may
be endogenous with respect to unobserved characteristics ￿jt and I assume that ￿with the
exception of prices ￿these observed characteristics will be exogenous with respect to changes
in these unobserved characteristics.
The innovation in the unobserved characteristics can be expressed as pseudo-di⁄erences
in the mean utilities ^ ￿jt, more speci￿cally:
&jt = (^ ￿jt ￿ ￿^ ￿jt￿1) ￿ ￿
x(xjt ￿ ￿xjt￿1)
where ^ ￿jt are the mean net augmented utilities for each product j at time t: Hence, pseudo-
di⁄erences in xjt are used as instruments to identify ￿x: These pseudo-di⁄erences are valid
instruments if consumers cannot predict the future value of & when making their decision at
time t:
Since current prices may be correlated with these innovations in product unobservables, I
will use lagged prices as an instrument, pjt￿1. Lagged prices are valid instruments as long as
the price of new goods and price of used cars are respectively set by ￿rms, or determined in
the secondary market without accounting for future values of & which cannot be forecasted
either by ￿rms or consumers. Following the same logic, I also used as instruments the
initial stock for each model at the beginning of each period, sijt￿1; and the market share of
purchased product in the previous period, sD
jt￿1. Finally, the lagged value of ^ ￿jt is also used
as an instrument to further help identify ￿:
24I have used the initial distribution implied by the dynamic model without transaction costs.
244 Results and Implications
4.1 Parameter Estimates: utility speci￿cation
Table 6 reports the parameter estimates associated with the characteristics of the cars as in
the utility speci￿cation. Multiple speci￿cations are provided: columns (1) and (2) report the
estimates of the full dynamic model respectively, with and without micro moments; column
(3) reports the estimates of a dynamic model without the transaction costs; column (4) the
estimates of the static model.
By looking at the ￿rst column, signs of coe¢ cients are as expected, with utility decreasing
from the price and the age of the car. The price coe¢ cient is estimated non linearly and the
magnitude is -53.52. A consumer obtains a positive ￿ ow utility from owning a car (relative
to the outside option) with a mean constant term of 4.04. The age of the car reduces the
utility. The heterogeneity in preference for age among consumers is captured by ￿age. The
coe¢ cient on engine size of 2.89 shows that consumers prefer cars with a higher cc engine.
Dummies for location suggest consumers￿preference for German cars.25 The dummy on fuel
shows that people prefer a gasoline rather than a diesel engine. The positive coe¢ cient on
the fuel dummy interacted with time trend is capturing the increasing utility over time to
buy diesel cars. Over the considered time window, there is a substantial reduction in the
taxes owed to the government, especially for diesel engine cars; the model is able to capture
the increasing appeal for these vehicles due to this tax reduction.26 Future resale prices are
needed to obtain the rental price each year, I use observed future prices as a proxy for the
expected ones. As in assumption 2, unobservable product characteristics for each automobile
evolve according to a ￿rst-order autoregressive process, ￿ is estimated to be 0.39 which shows
a signi￿cant persistence in the unobservable over time. The micro moments improves the
iden￿cation of the consumer heterogeneity and the price coe¢ cient: ￿age becomes signi￿cant
in the speci￿cation with micro moments.
Column (3) provides estimates from the dynamic model where no transaction costs are
paid to replace the automobile, hence there are no frictions in the market. The dynamic
model without transaction costs has a simple analytical solution. For each consumer i the
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If there are no transaction costs, the problem is no longer state dependent and Et [EVi (k;:)] =
25The higher quality of new and used cars produced in Germany is in line with the ￿ndings of Emons &
Sheldon (2003) .
26In particular, the property tax fell progressively by more than 50%.
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The probability of purchasing any good j does not depend on the car owned. It is similar
to the static model but for presence of the expected price in the ￿ ow utility function as
in the dynamic model with transaction costs. The very imprecise price coe¢ cient (which
becomes insigni￿cant) and the unexpected sign on the characteristics that enter the mean
utility, suggest that the data cannot easily be explain by a dynamic model where consumers
are allowed to frequently replace their goods.
Column (4) reports the estimates from the static model with random coe¢ cients when
consumers choose between di⁄erent types of new and used cars and they do not face any
dynamic decisions and they do not pay any transaction costs. The price coe¢ cient drops
consistently with respect to the full dynamic model with transaction costs, and the coe¢ cient
estimates attached to the fuel dummy, and the fuel dummy interacted with time lose their
statistical signi￿cance. These parameters re￿ ect some dynamic consideration that the static
model is not able to capture. Other coe¢ cients seem plausible and have the same signs as
in the full speci￿cation. The random coe¢ cient attached to the consumer preference for the
age becomes insigni￿cant.
4.1.1 Price elasticities
In Table 7 and 8 I present the average28 own- and cross-price long-run elasticities simulated
from the full dynamic model and I compare them with the static price elasticities and
the dynamic model without transaction costs.29 I calculate the long-run elasticities using
permanent changes in the prices of a product. In particular, I allow for a permanent change
in the price of a new model, as well as the future price of the same model in the used market
in the following years30, keeping the percentage of the depreciation in price of the same
model across di⁄erent ages unchanged. Permanent changes capture the long-term e⁄ects of
the change on the consumer￿ s expectations. The elasticities were simulated for the dynamic
model as follows. First, I use the observed quantities to solve the consumer problem and
27Notice that EVi (0;:) no longer depends from the good held by consumers and it is constant across
products
28Market shares are used to weight the price-elasticities.
29Price elasticities for the dynamic model without micro moments are similar in magnitude to the ones
with micro moments.
30For example, I increase the price of new Fiat compact in 2000, the 1-year old Fiat compact in 2001, the
2-year old Fiat compact in 2002 and so on.
26estimate a baseline level of demand. Second, I generate a permanent change in the price
path of each product which will a⁄ect both the new and used market. I then re-solved the
dynamic model for the optimal consumers￿behavior, allowing the consumers to update their
beliefs. Finally, I simulated new choice probabilities, using them to compute the change
in choice probabilities relative to the initial values, and to compute the price elasticities.
The reported estimates are the average price own-price elasticities for new products in 1995,
distinguished by market segment and country of origin. The average cross-price elasticities
for new products are reported in Table 8. The cross-price elasticities are reported within
market segment and for di⁄erent car ages.
Table 7 reports the average own-price elasticities. The average elasticity for the static
model is -3.05. Using a price change of 5%, the estimates show that the myopic model
underestimates price elasticities (in absolute value) on average by 140%. Myopic consumers
do not consider the future utility of owning a product, as well as the possibility for consumers
to timing their purchases, which leads to a downward biased price, hence myopic consumers
underreact to a permanent price change. The own-price elasticities computed from the
static model and the full dynamic model are all greater than one in absolute value. Price
elasticities of the dynamic model without transaction costs are signi￿cantly smaller than
the static model, due to the bias in the price coe¢ cient which is about 4 times smaller in
magnitude than the static model and not signi￿catively di⁄erent from 0 (see Table 6). As
for the static model, the dynamic model without transaction costs does not rationalize the
possibility of consumers to wait and timing their purchase.
Table 8 shows the average value of the cross-price elasticities after a permanent change
in price. The ￿rst row of Table 8 reads as follows: after a 1% permanent increase in the
price of new cars belonging to the small car segment, there is on average a 17% increase
in demand of new cars within the same segment (￿rst column), a 10% increase in demand
of 3-year old cars within the same segment (second column), a 0.7% increase in demand of
6-year old cars (third column) in the same segment, and so on. It is interesting to observe
that the older are the cars within each segment the lower are the cross-price elasticities:
older cars are poorer substitutes for the new ones. Di⁄erently from a static model (and from
the dynamic model without transaction costs), the dynamic model (with transaction costs)
can generate negative cross-price elasticities. The dynamic model by explicitly solving the
sequence of consumers￿decisions, endogenizes the distribution of consumer holdings across
di⁄erent types of vehicles and time. A permanent increase in prices of new and used cars
will reduce the appeal for consumers to wait and replace their car (or buy one) in the near
future, which is re￿ ected in a lower continuation value. In particular, the model generates
negative cross price elasticities mostly for older cars as consumers switch from buying older
cars towards buying newer cars which will be held for longer periods.
274.2 Transaction costs
Transaction costs in my model (in the absence of asymmetric information) measure all possi-
ble frictions (i.e. taxes, search costs, dealer compensations etc.) which consumers incur upon
replacement. I estimate the whole distribution of transaction costs: Speci￿cally, I estimate
the average cost consumers pay to purchase a car j in period t: The monetary value of the
transaction costs is obtained by dividing the estimated transaction costs by the average price
coe¢ cient, once integrated over the income distribution.
As can be seen in Figure 5, the magnitude of transaction costs declines over time.31 The
e⁄ect is the result, among other factors, of a progressive reduction of the taxes paid upon
the transaction and a reduction of the interest rate due to the introduction of the European
currency. The average transaction cost was about e3000 in 1994 decreasing to e2000 in 2004,
the average standard deviation across time is about e580. The distribution of transaction
costs is shown in Figure 6; it shows a peak in the level of transaction costs between e1900
and e2600. The minimum level of the cost is about e1000.
It is also instructive to look at the distribution of the transaction cost/price ratio across
di⁄erent models and di⁄erent ages. Figure 7 shows that there is a peak between 20% and
40%, and most of the models show a level of transaction costs between 10% and 80% of the
respective level of prices.
Finally, I use the panel aspect of the data to track how transactions costs vary for car
models over time. I take the car models that I observe for more than 5 years and I compute
the standard deviation around the mean transaction cost for each one of them, the average
standard deviation across these models is about e390. This seems a moderate ￿ uctuation
associated with the changes in the car age, the evolution of the market and the presence of
aggregate shocks.
It is important to notice that the estimates do not refer to the costs that are actually
paid upon transaction, but rather to the costs of a hypothetical purchase of a particular car
j: In the model, people choose to buy a car only when the payo⁄ shocks are favorable. The
unexplained part of the utility ￿ ow, ￿ijt, may be viewed as either a preference shock, or a
shock to the cost (or both), with no way to distinguish between the two. The net cost paid
upon a transaction is therefore less than the amounts reported above.
External validation. The level of transaction costs explains the high persistence in the
stock of cars held by consumers . The results imply that on average, a consumer keeps her
automobile for about 7 years. This result is obtained without accounting for the truncations
31The estimate of the transaction costs are relative to used cars only. For new cars, I cannot identify the
size of the transaction costs. In the estimation procedure, I assume that whoever purchases a new car pays
taxes and other costs of registration as speci￿ed by Quattroruote: These costs vary between e350 and e800
according to the type of the new vehicle purchased.
28in the data. Are these ￿gures reasonable? According to the information published in the
magazine Quattroruote in 1998, the explicit costs to sustain upon a transaction of a used car
varies between e1000 and e4000. The composition of these costs is the following: ￿nancial
costs about e400; Quattroruote reports that on average, the money borrowed to buy a used
car in 1998 was e5000 and the spread over a safe interest rate was about 8%. The taxes and
expenses to pay upon the transaction varied between e340 and e1600 according to the size
and the type of cars. The dealer compensation for trading a used car also varied between
e300 and e2000 according to the model. In addition, one has to account for the hidden
costs like search costs, asymmetric information and so on. The above analysis con￿rms that
the estimations of the model seem to have the right magnitude and transaction costs as
would be expected, to play a substantial role in a consumers￿replacement decision. In Table
10, I compare the transaction cost estimates with the taxes and the dealer compensations
as reported in Quattroruote relative to few models. The di⁄erence can be explained by the
presence of ￿nancial costs, search costs and similar costs also sustained by the seller of a
used car.
Decomposition of transaction costs. Next I try to investigate the composition of
the transaction costs in more detail. Table 9 reports the parameter estimates of transaction
costs regressed on a set of variables. We can observe that the coe¢ cient associated with the
stock of each car type in percentage terms is negative and highly signi￿cant. This result
indicates that having more cars in the market reduces the costs associated with ￿nding the
right match. More speci￿cally, an increase of 1% in the stock of cars available reduces the
transaction costs by e310. This relation captures one of the essential characteristics of a
decentralized market: traders must incur costs to search for trading opportunities. Thinner
markets cause higher search costs. Instead, the matching between buyers and sellers becomes
easier in a thicker market where larger stocks of cars are available. In this sense, cars with
a thicker market are more liquid. The reason is that cars with a thin market are more
di¢ cult to sell, and they have higher option values: consumers choose to hold on to them for
longer periods. Hence as expected, the transaction costs decrease in the stock of each type
of car available. Moreover, the e⁄ect of trading frictions transmits to transaction prices by
decreasing on average their level, i.e. cars with lower transaction costs have higher demand
and higher levels of price.
The variable Diesel*Time trend captures the reduction of taxes over time, relative to
the car with Diesel engines as discussed above. The costs are increasing in the engine
displacement, as higher taxes and fees are usually associated with bigger cars. Notice the
transaction costs display a decreasing trend over time, con￿rming that the used car market
has become more active since 1994. This is consistent with the information displayed in
Figures 1 and 2. The e⁄ect is the result of a progressive reduction in the taxes to pay upon
29registration, the enhancement of Internet transactions and the introduction of the Euro ￿
and the consequent reduction of the interest rate and transaction costs across EU countries.
Finally, there is a negative coe¢ cient associated with the FIAT dummy which may re-
￿ ect the presence of a dense network of FIAT dealers as well as a lower maintenance costs
associated with the national manufactured cars that reduces the risk and cost of buying a
used vehicle.32
The range of transaction costs is in line with evidence found elsewhere and it varies with
vehicles and market characteristics in an intuitively plausible way, lending support to validity
of the estimates
5 The Scrappage Policy
Scrappage subsidies have been particularly popular in the European Union (EU), as well as
in the United States and Canada. These policies were aimed to reduce pollution by forcing
an early retirement of old and polluting cars but they were also aimed, in some cases, at
stimulating the national car industries. Typically, these subsidies were between e500 and
e1,500 and eligibility to participate in the program was a function of the vehicle￿ s age (e.g.
the automobile must be 10 years old or older). During the 1990s, most EU countries o⁄ered
scrappage subsidies. France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy and Spain required that to
be eligible for these subsidies, the replacement vehicle had to be new. These policies are
called cash-for-replacement schemes. On the other hand, Denmark and Norway as well as
the United States and Canada, did not impose any constraints on the type of replacement
vehicle ￿ they followed a cash-for-scrappage scheme.33
There has been a debate regarding the overall e⁄ects of these policies on car markets
and consumers￿welfare, especially considering that these programs could be expanded in
scope and duration. The model can help understanding their implications and e⁄ects. In
particular, in this section, I study the e⁄ect of the scrappage program implemented in Italy
in 1997 and 1998 which is summarized by Table 11. When the policy was implemented there
were about 34,000 potential cars elegible for the subsidy in the region and about 2,400 were
actually scrapped to get the discount on new vehicles.
32In the transaction costs regression I allow for the transaction costs to be correlated with the unobservable
characteristics of the car-type.
33See European Conference of Ministers of Transport Publications (1999), EPA (1998) and Hahn (1995)
for a comprehensive description of the di⁄erent scrappage subsidy programs in the United States and Europe.
305.1 Policy Evaluation
Using the framework developed and the estimates obtained from the previous sections, I pro-
ceed to examine the impact of the replacement scheme implemented in Italy. The model with
micro-moments replicates closely the impact of the scrappage policy on the number of new
vehicles purchased with the subsidy. In theory, policies that subsidize the replacement of old
cars operate through the optimal scrapping age and the requirement in terms of replacement
choice: cash-for-replacement schemes required that to be eligible for these subsidies, the
replacement vehicle had to be new, whereas cash-for-scrappage schemes did not impose any
constraint on the type of replacement vehicle. The initial e⁄ects of these policies depend on
the fraction of cars older than the (new) optimal scrapping age. The subsequent e⁄ects then
re￿ ect the evolution of the cross-sectional distribution once the policy change has occurred.
The idea that the policy will create an incentive to scrap older cars is obvious. The point of
doing the analysis is to quantify both the extent of the immediate incentive to replace and
the subsequent e⁄ects of this policy on new and used car sales as the distribution of car ages
evolves. The contribution of my model is to illustrate and study the e⁄ect of the scrappage
policies on sales and government revenues accounting for richer speci￿cations, where new
and used car markets interact, and consequently to evaluate richer design policies. I ￿nd
that these policies will boost sales of new cars in the short run but, at the same time, set
in motion variations in the cross-sectional distribution of car ages that create rich long-run
e⁄ects. In particular, bursts of activity associated with temporary scrapping subsidies are
short-lived: car production is reduced in future periods. In contrast, di⁄erent policies may
have di⁄erent e⁄ects on used car sales. Cash-for-scrappage schemes produces qualitatively
similar e⁄ects as for the new car sales whereas cash-for-replacement schemes has a more long
lasting e⁄ect of reducing the sales of used cars.
To evaluate the cash for replacement scheme in terms of my model and study the dynamics
and implications of the new and used automobile markets, I perform the following analysis.
I ￿rst simulate a baseline situation with no subsidies o⁄ered and I use it as the benchmark.
Hence I compare the new and used car sales and revenues (both in the short run and long run)
obtained from the baseline model with the results obtained from 3 di⁄erent policy scenarios.
The 3 policy scenarios I consider are the following: the cash-for-replacement scheme with
the same requirements and subsidies as those adopted by the Italian Government; the cash-
for-replacement scheme with same level of subsidies as before but the elegible consumers
must have a car older than 8 years (rather than 10); and the cash-for-scrappage scheme with
the subsidies ￿xed to 25% of the one implemented by the Italian Government, for cars older
than 10 years.
Figure 8 displays the aggregate sales of new cars for the di⁄erent schemes compared with
the baseline model. The simulation shows that these policies burst the aggregate sales of new
31cars followed by a contraction in sales. Sales remain lower for the next few years. The bigger
is the short-run e⁄ect of the subsidy in expanding the demand, the bigger is the contraction
in sales that follows in the future. In particular, the cash for replacement 8 and 10, increases
the new car sales by 126% and 97% in 1997 and 69% and 51% in 1998 respectively. It follows
a contraction in sales of 11% and 6% respectively in 1999 which remain lower than the sales
in the baseline model until 2003, with a total contraction of 25% and 16%. The cash for
scrappage policy has a much smaller impact on the sales on new cars with a total increase of
9%, which is followed by a total reduction in sales of 6%. The e⁄ect lasts until 2003. In 2004,
there is a slight increase in the number of new cars bought as the generation of cars from
the policy reform are starting to be replaced/scrapped. Across all policies, the contraction
in sales is smaller in magnitude compared to the increase due to the implementation of the
scrappage scheme. The model accounts for the fact that consumers using the subsidy to buy
a new cars are the ones who would most likely have bought either a used car, kept the same
one or chosen the outside option.
This ￿nding is reinforced by looking at the used-car market sales. Figure 9 shows that
the cash-for-replacement schemes reduce the sales in the used car market and this negative
e⁄ect on sales is more persistent than the contraction of the new car sales. As I discussed
above, these policies are aimed at consumers with low income and/or low sensitivity to the
car age. Hence they reduce the demand for used cars in the short and long run. The cash-
for-replacement 8 years has a more negative e⁄ect than the 10 years one. Both schemes
determine a contraction in sales of respectively 23% and 27%. In contrast, the cash-for-
scrappage bursts the sales of used cars as well as the sales of new cars with a bigger e⁄ect on
the ￿rst group (63% vs 9% in two years). After the expansion in sales, there is a contraction
on the used market with a total reduction in sales of 9%.
Compared with the study of Adda and Cooper (2000), my model would predict a smaller
contraction in new car sales following a replacement subsidy. In their model, consumers are
homogenous and there is no active second-hand market hence the subsidy leads consumers
to anticipate their replacement decision causing a contraction in future sales of new cars.
In my model, the subsidy will a⁄ect more consumers who would have purchased a used car
otherwise, hence the contraction in sales is more evident in the secondary market rather
than in the primary market. Moreover, my model provides a more complete framework to
evaluate policy design according to their requirement decisions and the consequent impact
on new or used car markets and revenues.
The second exercise is to study the e⁄ect of these policies on the Government revenues.
The evaluation should account for both the short term e⁄ect and for the long term dynamics.
On the one hand, the Government supports a cost in implementing the scrappage policy equal
to the subsidies disbursed, on the other hand, the Government collects the V.A.T. on the
32new car sales which was 19% in 1997 and 20% from 2000 until 2004. Moreover, the Province
(the local government) collects a tax for each purchase of a new and a used car equal to
e77.47 in 1997 and to e150.81 from 1998 until 2004. Hence the evaluation of the policy
should also take the direct redistribution of revenues from the central to the local government
into account.
I consider the same policies implemented above. Figure 10 shows the net e⁄ect on
government revenues compared with the baseline option for the three policies. Figure 11
displays instead the net change in revenue (compared with the baseline model) collected
by the Province. Finally, Table 12 reports the present discounted value of the Government
revenue, of the Province revenue calculated for the baseline model, as well as the changes
due to the implementation of the various policies. On average, the cash for replacement
policies increase the revenue of the central government, whereas the cash for scrappage
scheme determined a fall due to a lower impact on new car sales and the consequent reduction
on the V.A.T. collected, along with the larger number of subsidies awarded. Even if the cash-
for-replacement 8 years determine a bigger increase in the revenue in the short run, compared
with the cash-for-replacement 10 years, the net present discounted value of revenues under
the two policies are similar, due to a bigger contraction in sales under the 8-years policy. At
the local government level, the impact is exactly the opposite since the cash for scrappage
policy causes an overall greater jump in total sales.
Notice that the cash-for-scrappage scheme has similar e⁄ect on the automobile market
due to the reduction of transaction costs of the same magnitude. Hence the Government
could achieve the same results by temporally reducing the taxes to pay upon transactions,
or by making the secondary market more liquid by improving competition among dealers
and/or reducing the search costs.
The previous simulations show that these policies have quite a di⁄erent impact on the
number of used cars scrapped and on the number of new cars purchased. A more complete
evaluation of the costs and bene￿ts of the scrappage policies should account for the emission
reductions, and the change in unemployment rate which is a potential area for future research.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a structural model of dynamic demand for automobiles that explicitly
accounts for the replacement decision of consumers in the presence of a second-hand market.
The model incorporates the feature that consumer replacement is costly due to the presence
of transaction costs. In addition, it allows for rational expectations about future product
attributes, heterogeneous consumers with persistent heterogeneity over time and endogeneity
of prices. The data set that I use for the estimation provides information about sales for
33individual cars over time as well as information about prices and characteristics of cars.
The estimation of the transaction costs is achieved from the di⁄erence between the share of
consumers that choose to hold a given car type each period and the share of consumers that
choose to purchase the same car type in each period. The dynamic aspect of the model and
the presence of transaction costs are essential to explain the sales pattern in the primary and
in the secondary market. If these costs were ignored, it would not be possible to explain the
high persistency in the stock of cars held by consumers.
The model is particularly useful in analyzing the e⁄ects of policies directed at modifying
the replacement decisions that in turn have an impact on the overall distribution of vehicle
holdings. My approach highlights the quantitative response to individual agents to policy
variations in a model where new and used markets interact. Furthermore, the consequent
evolution of the cross-sectional distribution creates persistent e⁄ects of the policies. Con-
sequently, policy analysis is much more di¢ cult in this setting since the evolution of the
cross-sectional distribution must be taken into account. That said, the analysis illustrates
that taking these dynamics into account is feasible and instructive for both the design and
evaluation of policies.
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Resale ratio  0.247 0.2862 
N. Obs.   40148 











Average Price in 
Euros
1994 New  1297  13,000 
 Used  2503  4,000 
1995 New  1292  12,300 
 Used  3014  4,100 
1996 New  1259  13,200 
 Used  2658  4,900 
1997 New  2141  13,400 
 Used  2713  5,150 
1998 New  2195  13,350 
 Used  2980  5,100 
1999 New  3023  14,600 
 Used  3272  5,050 
2000 New  2086  14,200 
 Used  3090  5,300 
2001 New  2092  14,600 
 Used  2336  5,400 
2002 New  2244  16,700 
 Used  3345  6,000 
2003 New  1908  16,400 
 Used  3462  6,750 
2004 New  2111  17,050 
 Used  3933  6,700 
 










Estimation: Volume of trade (1994-2004) 
  
Parameters       
Constant -0.0091  (0.1665) 
Depreciation 0.1617





Diesel -0.0093  (0.0096) 
Fiat 0.0336
** (0.0098) 
Model dummies  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses; statistical significance at 5% level 
indicated with **, and at 10% with *. R-squared 0.41. Obs. 1648 











Estimation: Volume of trade (2002-2004) 
  
Parameters       
Transaction costs  -0.0434
** (0.0211)





CC      0.0977   (0.0366)
Diesel    -0.0318  (0.2949)
Fiat 0.0727
** (0.0283)
Model dummies  Yes
Year dummies  Yes
 Standard errors in parentheses; statistical significance at 5% level 
indicated with **, and at 10% with *.  R-squared 0.27. Obs. 437
 









































** (0.13)  -2.20
**  (0.09) 
Engine size (CC)  2.89
** (0.30) 3.05
** (0.31) -0.19
  (0.24)  1.18
**  (0.15) 
Fiat  0.10   (0.13)  0.12   (0.13)  0.48
** (0.23)  0.62
** (0.16) 
German 0.51
** (0.16)  0.53
** (0.17)  -0.01
  (0.23)  0.55
**  (0.15) 
Diesel -3.42
**  (029) -3.47
** (0.29) 0.41
  (0.56)  0.11  (0.38) 
Diesel*Time trend  0.33
** (0.03)  0.34
** (0.03)  0.01
  (0.05)  -0.01  (0.04) 
     
NON LINEAR 
PARAMETERS      
 
(Price- Expected 
Price),  αp 
-53.52
** (5.43) -55.90
** (12.91)  -2.04  (4.52)  - 
Price,  αp              -9.32
** (6.13) 
Log(Age),  σage  0.32
** (0.08) 0.16   
 (0.45) 0.24




** (0.23)   0.75
**  (0.02) 
  
Standard errors in parentheses; statistical significance at 5% level indicated with **, and at 10% with * 































































  Domestic 
  Foreign 
  Midsize car 
  Domestic 
  Foreign 
Large car 
  Domestic 
  Foreign 
 
Table 7: Own-price elasticity - Market shares are used to weight the price-elasticities. 





Within Market Segment Cross-Price Elasticities (Year, 1995) 
 
  Market 
Segment  New  3-year 
old 
6-year 
old  9-year old 
Full Dynamic 
Model 
Small  car  0.2226 0.1253 0.0383  -0.0559 
Midsize car  0.1110  0.0683  -0.0372  -0.0841 
Large  car  0.0985 0.0809 0.0320  0.0093 
Static Model 
 
Small  car  0.0225 0.0176 0.0142  0.0111 
Midsize  car  0.0135 0.0104 0.0071  0.0048 




Small  car  0.0012 0.0012 0.0012  0.0011 
Midsize  car  0.0006 0.0006 0.0006  0.0005 
Large  car  0.0003 0.0003 0.0003  0.0003 
 
Table 8: Within segment cross-price elasticity of cars of different ages are reported. The elasticities are 










Log- Engine size (CC)  0.28
**   (0.8) 
Fiat -0.24
** (0.03) 
Diesel*Time trend  -0.02
** (0.004) 
Log - Initial Stock  -0.14
** (0.02) 
Log - Price  -0.61
** (0.03) 





Standard errors in parentheses; statistical significance at 5% level indicated 
with **, and at 10% with *. R-squared 0.45. Obs.1483 
 
 















Alfa 156 1.6i  1999  1  € 1675  € 2400 
BMW 318i  1999  3  € 1700  € 1700 
Fiat Punto 1.9 D  2003  2  € 950  € 1400 
Audi A3 1.6 D  2003  5  € 1450  € 1940 
 











January 1997  October, 1997  February, 1998 
 
Time in force 
 




€775 + €922 
€1033+€1229  €775 + €922  €775+€922 
€620+€738 
 
Requirement  To scrap a car aged 
10 years or older 
and buy a new one 
with an equal 
discount from the 
manufacturers. The 
first discount  was 
awarded for  a new 
car with cc<1300 
and the second for 
cc >1300 
To scrap a car aged 
10 years or older 
and buy a new one 
with an equal 
discount from the 
manufacturers 
To scrap a car aged 
10 years or older 
and buy a new one 
with an equal 
discount from the 
manufacturers.  
The discounts were 
awarded 
respectively for a  
new with average 
consumption <7 















  Baseline model Change after cash 
for replacement 10
Change after cash 





revenue  20,641  555 576  -1,776 
Province 
Revenue  4,786  -28 -36  134 
Value in 000s 
 


































































































































































Figure 11 – Expected province revenues relative to the baseline model with no subsidy 
 